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Introduction
Many applications need to store long-term data and retrieve it for later use. These applications range from single user applications storing personal information to multiuser collaborative applications that allow users to share stored data. Furthermore, these applications may run on computers that range from desktops to mobile and hand held devices. For example, the Aware Home [1] that has been built at the Georgia Institute of Technology is an information rich environment where a number of devices capture informa-£ This work was supported in part by NSF grants CCR-9988212, ITR-0081276 and CCR-TC-0208655. tion about the residents and their activities. Such information, which could be of sensitive nature, is stored and accessed by a number of applications. Several characteristics of computers that execute such applications make them unsuitable for storing sensitive information. First, the devices may be resource poor and may not be able to store long-term data. Second, they can be easily stolen or compromised and hence cannot be trusted with long term storage of data that has confidentiality and integrity requirements. Third, when data size becomes large, storage management is expensive and prone to errors. As ubiquitous applications proliferate, the need for services that can store data securely will arise in environments that span the home and community where fewer assumptions can be made about proper system management.
It would be desirable to provide an easy to manage data repository service for applications that store and access sensitive information. The kind of data that would be stored in the data storage service imposes several requirements on its design. First, the data has to be highly available and quickly accessible to distributed clients. Second, access to private or sensitive data should be controlled. In particular, confidentiality and integrity of the stored data should not be compromised. Third, these requirements should be met even when some number of servers in the secure store are compromised by an adversary.
We present the design and analysis of a distributed data store that can meet both security and performance requirements. Our design integrates two well known techniques, namely replication and secret sharing to achieve this goal. Our key contribution is an architecture that provides desirable levels of security guarantees and performance by exploiting the natural tradeoffs possible between the two conflicting goals. We present protocols that allow data to be read and written in a system that replicates data shares, even when some number of nodes can be compromised. To provide additional security we advocate periodic share renewal. Similarly we use update dissemination among replicas to improve performance. We present an analysis of the system to demonstrate the tradeoffs that are offered by our design.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe approaches based on replication and secret sharing briefly, and argue why a combination of the two offers a better solution. In section 3, we discuss related work that has been done in the past. In section 4, we describe the architecture of the secure store and discuss the related protocols. We do a simple analysis of our system in section 5 and show the tradeoffs permitted by our design for various security and performance requirements. We conclude with a discussion about future work in the last section.
Approach
There are two distinct approaches for building a highly available distributed storage service. One is the well known replication technique [6, 7] . Second approach is based on secret sharing schemes [3, 5] . Each of these techniques focuses on optimizing different sets of requirements. While replication enhances availability and increases performance by exploiting data locality and keeping access costs low, schemes based on secret sharing offer better data confidentiality when some number of nodes are compromised.
In a pure replication scheme, the servers are replicas of each other, storing copies of the same set of data items. When such a scheme is used, data has to be encrypted before storing it at servers to offer data confidentiality. A client which does the encryption, would hide the key from the servers, so that a compromised server cannot disclose any information stored at it. When the data so encrypted is shared among a dynamic set of clients, key management becomes an important issue. Whenever a client leaves the set of authorized clients, data has to be re-encrypted using a new key and the new key has to be distributed to the remaining clients. Furthermore, keys have finite lifetime and data has to be periodically re-encrypted using a new key. All replicated copies have to be renewed. If one of the servers is compromised, such a server could retain a copy of the data encrypted with the old key. Thus content of long-lived data could be leaked over time. Thus, even if data is encrypted with a key that only authorized clients know, storing all the information in encrypted form entirely at any server site would lead to a possibility of information leakage.
A´ µ secret sharing scheme [3, 10] transforms a data item into pieces (called data shares or fragments) such that or fewer shares do not give any information about the data content and any · ½ shares can be used to reconstruct the original data value. This scheme can be used to guarantee both data confidentiality and data availability when the number of compromised nodes is not more than . Secret sharing schemes offer confidentiality through access control at the servers as opposed to encryption schemes that are based on problems that are hard to compute.
Secret sharing schemes, at the expense of higher communication and computational cost, eliminate the problem of key management. Some secret sharing schemes also allow periodic renewal of shares by the servers without client participation [5] . If the adversary is limited to compromising no more than nodes in any time-interval of certain length, say Ì Ú units, by doing share renewal at a faster rate, no information would be leaked to an adversary ever. Thus, secret sharing schemes are capable of guaranteeing long term secrecy of data content.
While a pure secret sharing scheme offers better confidentiality, such a scheme would result in high access cost. For example, consider a system of Ò servers. Let us assume that not more than servers are compromised. Consider transforming a data item into Ò shares using a´ Òµ secret sharing scheme . Writing such a data item would involve contacting all Ò servers. Reading would involve contacting a minimum of · ½ servers and upto ¾ · ½ servers when some servers are compromised. When Ò is very large, write cost could be significantly high even when the number of compromised servers is small.
The cost of write operations could be reduced by allowing a client to write only ¾ · ½data shares and then generating rest of the shares at other servers from the already written ones [5] . Such a generation of each data share involves one or more rounds of Ç´ ¾ µ messages exchanged between ¾ · ½ or more servers. Thus, generating new shares at other servers is a costly and time-consuming process.
Yet another approach is one that combines data replication with key fragmentation. In this scheme, a data item is encrypted and the encrypted version is replicated across servers. The key that is to be shared among clients is fragmented using a secret sharing scheme and distributed across servers. Thus, any client that wants to access a data item would first obtain the key by contacting · ½ servers and then access an encrypted copy of the data item. This is the approach taken by Herlihy et. al. [23] . An extension to this scheme is the scheme proposed by Krawczyk [24] which secret-shares encrypted data using Rabin's information dispersal algorithm [11] . We consider this scheme as one of many secret sharing schemes that our proposed system could use.
In this paper, we propose integrating the two approaches, replication and secret sharing, to meet both performance and security requirements of applications. In our approach, servers are divided into distinct sets, where is typically ¾ · ½ . Servers in the same set store replicas of the same data shares. Initially a data item is transformed into shares using a´ µ secret sharing scheme and one share is written to each of the sets, choosing one server from each set. A share is then disseminated to other servers in the same set. A client would contact ·½servers that store distinct shares to retrieve a data item. Access cost as seen by the client is low since a client needs to contact a maximum of only ¾ · ½ servers for reads and writes, even when Ò is large. Here, we are interested only in access cost as seen by the client and hence ignore the cost involved in disseminating shares to other servers (dissemination can be done asynchronously in the background across nodes that implement the secure store). As a consequence of this design, only weak forms of consistency are guaranteed for the stored data when the data is updated frequently. Higher data locality is possible because of replication of shares which could lead to better performance. Thus, the system is able to offer improved data confidentiality, while offering some of the benefits of replication schemes.
Pure replication and pure secret sharing schemes are extreme cases of the generalized scheme presented here, when is set to ½ and Ò respectively. By increasing from ½ to Ò, the system goes from a purely replicated one to a purely secret-shared system. Thus, by increasing , the system offers better security against compromised servers at the cost of low availability and high access costs . The choice of depends on the relative importance of security requirements to performance needs. Thus, integration of replication with secret sharing results in the design of a secure store that retains benefits of both these techniques and offers tradeoffs that are not possible with either technique alone.
Related work
Replication schemes that tolerate Byzantine faults 1 in a distributed environment have been studied well in the past. Schneider presented a generalized state machine replication approach to fault tolerance [6] . Liskov and Castro gave a practical implementation of the state machine approach for a file system that tolerated Byzantine faults [7] . The state machine approach does not scale well with large number of servers for the reason that each request involves two or more rounds of communication involving all the servers.
Quorum systems are popular for managing replicated data. The Phalanx [2] and Fleet [8] systems were built using a quorum approach to tolerate Byzantine faults. In a quorum scheme, operations are done with sets of servers (quorums) that sufficiently overlap with each other to tolerate some number of malicious failures. Though access cost can be reduced to some extent by weakening the consistency guarantee, it can still be quite high for some class of applications. Alvisi et. al. presented a scheme to dynamically change the threshold value (the number of failures to be tolerated) based on the estimated number of faults per-ceived [9] and thus avoiding the use of large quorums when the actual number of compromised nodes is small.
Both these approaches do not offer data confidentiality unless encryption schemes are used. Alternatively, secret sharing schemes that do not use encryption keys were developed to offer data confidentiality even when some number of nodes are compromised. Shamir and Blakley gave simple secret sharing schemes based on polynomial interpolation and intersection of hyper planes, respectively [3, 10] . A number of other schemes have also been developed [11, 13, 24] . Tompa et. al. [12] , Feldman [14] , Pederson [15] and Krawzcyk [25] have also considered malicious corruption of shares either by servers or by a client.
More recently Herzberg et. al. developed a proactive secret sharing scheme where servers could proactively recover and renew their shares in a distributed manner to protect information against an adversary who can dynamically compromise nodes [5] . Our discussion here uses techniques presented in this paper, in particular, the share renewal and share recovery protocols.
Herlihy and Tygar developed a scheme where data is encrypted and the key is secret-shared [23] . Krawzcyk presented a computationally secure secret sharing scheme combining secret sharing with encryption and Rabin's information dispersal [24] . Naor and Wool presented a scheme in which access control servers are different from storage servers [26] . However, they considered the case of benign server faults and malicious clients.
The PASIS project [16] at CMU very closely relates to our work. PASIS considers various secret sharing and other schemes to store data securely in a data repository. However, PASIS does not consider integration of replication and secret sharing. Fray et. al. proposed an approach similar to ours, fragmentation-scattering [21] , where fragments of cipher text are replicated. However replication was achieved by clients broadcasting the fragments. They did not consider fragment dissemination or periodic renewal of fragments. Other related works include data dissemination in benign [17] and malicious environments [18, 19, 20] .
System Architecture and Protocols
Our secure store is implemented by a set of Ò servers. Clients make read and write requests with subsets of servers. Each request is authenticated and authorized individually by every server. Hence, we assume the presence of appropriate public key infrastructure. Each client and server node has a private key for which the public key is well known. Besides these keys, clients and servers also negotiate symmetric keys periodically to exchange messages. Thus, we assume all communication channels are secure against eavesdropping, modification and replay attacks. Requests are authorized using access control lists at each server, which are updated securely and in a timely fashion by a system administrator, possibly using a separate service.
We assume a Byzantine fault model [4] for servers, where a compromised node can behave arbitrarily. Any compromised node can disclose data shares it holds, corrupt the shares and possibly collude with other compromised nodes. Both our system architecture and protocols are designed to tolerate a certain number of Byzantine faults. This number, denoted by , is referred to as the threshold value of the system in this paper. For the rest of the section, we assume that a threshold value has been chosen and that in any time interval of length Ì Ú units, not more than servers are compromised. We refer to the constant Ì Ú as the vulnerability window.
The set of Ò servers is arranged logically in a twodimensional matrix as shown in figure 1. The server in Ø row and Ø column is denoted by Ë . Number of columns is denoted by and number of rows Ö with Ö Ò. We assume that is at least · ½ . A data item is fragmented into shares using a´ µ secret sharing scheme and is stored as shares at the servers. For a particular data item, servers along a column store copies of the same data share and each column stores a different share. Both security and performance levels change with values chosen for and , as we will see in section 5. The operation of our secure store is characterized by the following three sets of protocols:
1. Read and write protocols that are used by clients to access the data.
2.
A dissemination protocol which is used by the servers to propagate new data shares.
3. A share renewal protocol that is run periodically to generate new data shares for long-term confidentiality.
Data consistency becomes an issue when data is replicated. We do not discuss in this paper how data consistency is guaranteed when clients access shared data items. Our store is capable of offering two kinds of weak consistency guarantees, namely Monotonic Read Consistency and Causal Consistency. We showed in [22] how such consistency can be achieved when data is replicated, in the presence of some malicious servers. The read and write protocols presented here can be modified in a similar fashion to offer these consistency guarantees.
In this paper, we use a specific verifiable secret sharing scheme due to Feldman [14] for our protocols. The use of this scheme, as discussed in [5] , results in (1) easy verification of a share during dissemination, (2) renewal of shares in a purely distributed fashion, and (3) regeneration of lost shares. We could use any secret sharing scheme that has these properties. In the following subsections, we discuss 000 000 111 111 000 000 111 111 
Read and Write Protocols
We do not consider the case of clients being malicious. While malicious clients cannot do any harm to data items for which they do not have access, they can, however, exhaust a server's storage or write garbage to the data items for which they have write access. We rely on detecting malicious clients and using authorization and access control mechanisms to stop malicious clients from doing any harm. Figure 2 shows the write and read protocols when all clients are assumed to be non-malicious. In a write operation, a client fragments a data item into shares using á µ secret sharing scheme. One-way functions ´Üµ are computed for these shares and concatenated to form a verification string. We discuss issues related to the choice of an one-way function in the following subsections. Verification string is required to let a server know if a share it received in dissemination has been corrupted. Verification string also helps a reading client choose the right set of · ½ shares to reconstruct the data. For write, the shares are sent to servers along a row, each receiving a different share along with Ù of the data item, timestamp, the verification string and the signature of the whole write. Since some servers that are contacted can be compromised, the write is repeated with different rows until the number Ð of rows contacted is such that Ð is at least · ½ . Since maximum number of columns in which all Ð servers contacted are compromised is Ð , writing to Ð rows ensures that in each of · ½ or more columns, at least one non-malicious server has received the write message.
While reading, a client sends a read request for the object to servers along a randomly chosen row. It collects · ½ or more shares corresponding to the same timestamp and reconstructs the data value. Finally it verifies the signature 
Dissemination
Our write protocol may write each share to only one server in a column. To provide better performance and availability, shares written at one set of servers should be disseminated to other servers so that the data is available for access at other servers. Hence, in the secure store, shares are disseminated along columns. Data dissemination for non- malicious environments was studied in [17] . Presence of malicious servers requires a more careful treatment. Byzantine nodes can modify the data being disseminated and thus can compromise the availability and integrity of the data. One approach for secure dissemination is to attach an unforgeable signature of the writing client to the data being disseminated. We disseminate data shares rather than the data item itself. Since shares could change over time due to periodic share renewal (dicussed in section 4.3), the client has to recompute the signature of the shares. However, it is a desirable feature to do share renewal without requiring client participation, as we will see in section 4.3.
Secure dissemination schemes without public key signatures have been addressed by others [18, 19, 20] . These schemes require data to be written to at least · ½non-faulty nodes initially before being disseminated. We cannot adopt these schemes to disseminate data shares for the reason that each share is written to only one server initially.
We use verification strings to secure the dissemination of data shares. Usual signature verification is replaced by a set of one-way function verifications. Thus, a server verifies a data share it receives in dissemination by checking it against the one-way function of the share ´ µ. The verification string, which is a concatenated list of one-way functions of the shares of a data item, should be fully reliable since a corrupted verification string can verify a manipulated share to be correct. Hence, verification string itself is written by the client along with shares and disseminated to other servers securely using any of the secure dissemination schemes [18, 19, 20] . We require that the verification string be disseminated across columns, among all servers. A server accepts a verification string as valid only if · ½ or more servers are known to have accepted the same verification string for a given timestamp. Once a server accepts a list of one-way functions as valid for a timestamp, it accepts the corresponding share by verifying that the one-way function applied on that particular share matches the corresponding part of the verification string. This way, a compromised server cannot modify and disseminate a corrupted share without going undetected, even when colluding with other malicious servers.
Hence, our dissemination protocol works in two parts:
(1) dissemination of verification string, (2) dissemination of shares. Figure 4 describes the dissemination protocol. In addition to dissemination of shares and verification string, we add a component to detect corrupted shares and regenerate correct shares. Servers also probabilistically suspect corruption of shares and verify the correctness of shares by pulling verification strings from other servers. Share recovery involves getting secondary shares from · ½ or more other servers, each from a different column, to recover the corrupted or missing share. This scheme is described in [5] . Once the right share is constructed, this share is disseminated along the column. Share recovery is costly and we expect that, if there are only few malicious servers in the system, share recovery would be done only infrequently. During share renewal, the shares of a date item change, but the new verification string can still be computed securely and reliably, even in the presence of active attackers during the phase of share renewal [5] . Thus, even after share renewal, we can disseminate the new shares securely as we did before share renewal.
Dissemination of verification string
1. During a write operation, client writes Î Ë to all servers it contacts(at least ¾ · ½ ). 
Share Renewal Protocol
We assume that an adversary cannot compromise more than nodes in any time frame of length Ì Ú . However, this does not prevent an adversary from compromising · ½ or more nodes over a longer period of time and obtain · ½ or more shares to learn the content of a data item. Hence, the shares need to be periodically renewed, in a distributed manner, so that an adversary who obtains shares before share renewal cannot use them in any manner in future to gain any information, even if he finds additional data shares. The share renewal of a data item is done without the participation of the client that wrote it. This enables share renewal even when the client is offline for an extended time period.
Share-renewal is very expensive and the frequency with which shares of a data item are renewed can be tuned depending on the sensitivity of the stored data item. Shares of data items that lose value over time are renewed less frequently as they age. Also shares of data items that are frequently over-written by clients do not need renewal. Share renewal is done only for those data items that need long term secrecy.
In this paper, we use the share renewal protocol proposed by Herzberg et. al. for Feldman's secret sharing scheme as discussed in [5] . For a given data item, servers belonging to one row initiate a share renewal protocol. At the end of share renewal, the shares are renewed while the data content and other meta-data are retained. The verification string is also updated securely for the new shares. The protocol guarantees that if the number of non-faulty servers is a majority, at the end of the protocol, all non-faulty servers hold valid shares and a copy of the same valid verification string. From then on, the new shares are disseminated as before. No data share is stored at any non-malicious server beyond Ì Ú seconds after its renewal. A share is erased either when a new share arrives or when the share expires. This is critical to guaranteeing confidentiality since share renewal schemes rely on erasing the old shares. Herzberg et. al. [5] assume a secure broadcast channel for share renewal protocol. In our system, we could dedicate a set of servers for this purpose, on a single shared wire, doing share renewal for different data items.
The one-way function used in Feldman's scheme is Ü where is a primitive element in the field 2 from which values for Ü are chosen. While this works for our solution, this is costly in terms of storage space required (large verification string) and in terms of computation.
Data items that are over-written frequently by clients and those that do not have strict long-term confidentiality requirements do not need share renewal. For such data items, eliminating share renewal eliminates the need to use an ex-pensive one-way function like Ü for verification string. In such cases, a simple digest function like MD5 could be used for ´Üµ. Data items that need stronger secrecy guarantee would use the more expensive one-way function Ü .
To save on storage space, we use ´ Ü µ where is a cryptographic digest like MD5 at the expense of incurring an additional round during share-renewal. Although verification using such expensive one-way functions is computationally intensive, this cost would not be incurred in the dissemination protocol in the common case when most of the servers are not malicious. Only when servers detect corruption of shares, or suspect corruption probabilistically, the verification cost would be incurred. However, reading and writing for such cases would be computationally expensive. So would be share-renewal in the absence of writes. This is a tradeoff clients are offered to decide if a data item should be stored at such a high security level. In place of the function Ü for ´Üµ, we could use any one-way function that satisfies certtain properties as required by the share-renewal protocol. We are currently exploring possible alternative one-way functions that can be used in place of Ü .
Analysis
In this section, we do an analysis of the secure store based on a probabilistic model and show how the choice of a threshold value and other parameters affect the security and performance of the system. During any continuous time interval of length Ì Ú units, we assume that any server can be compromised with a probability Ô. Thus, expected number of compromised servers during a time interval of length Ì Ú would be ÒÔ. However, a lower or higher value can be chosen for to tolerate certain number of failures depending on whether better performance or better security is desired. We assume that the probability of compromising one node is independent of the other. Thus, in the analysis, we do not consider the case of related or similar attacks on nodes operating on same OS or run time code. The analysis we provide here is a simplified one and its goal is to provide us with insights into how some parameters affect security and performance levels offered by the system. In particular, it gives us a direction as to what threshold value and the degree of replication should be chosen, given the desired levels of various security and performance metrics.
We consider the following security metrics.
Availability : Availability is defined as the probability that a legitimate client can read a data item that has been written successfully.
Confidentiality : Confidentiality is defined as complement of the probability that an adversary can read a data item that has been written successfully.¯I ntegrity : Integrity is defined as complement of the probability that a reading client could be returned corrupted data content without corruption being detected.
We assume that the servers are organized in columns and Ö rows with Ö Ò, where Ò is the total number of servers. Furthermore, we assume that a´ µ scheme is used for secret sharing. With these assumptions, the security metrics can be evaluated as follows:
Availability(«): «´ Òµ = probability of finding at least · ½ non faulty servers, one each from a different column. For our system, integrity is same as confidentiality since any compromised node can both disclose data shares and corrupt them. If use of signature is considered, integrity becomes the probability that a signature can be forged. In rest of the section, we discuss only confidentiality and availability as the primary security metrics.
In addition to these security metrics, for our system, we also define the following performance metrics.
Read cost : Read cost is defined as the expected number of servers a client needs to contact to read a data item successfully. A data item is read successfully upon collecting · ½ distinct shares for the data item.
Write cost : Write cost is defined as the number of servers a client needs to contact to write a data item at a confidence level h. By confidence level, we mean the probability that a write has been successfully completed, that is, at least one non-faulty server from each of · ½ or more columns has registered the write.
Both read and write costs are defined in terms of number of servers contacted. We expect the communication cost to be the dominant factor compared to the computation cost and hence discuss only communication costs in this section. This may not be true when we consider large data items. Secret sharing and data reconstruction are costly for such items. Furthermore, computation cost also increases with threshold value. Number of messages sent/received during a read or write operation is twice the number of servers contacted to complete the operation.
Read cost is calculated based on the following protocol: A client contacts ¾ · ½ servers, each from a different column. If it has successfully collected · ½ shares, read returns. Otherwise, client contacts additional servers as necessary. If Ô Ö is the probability that a client would find · ½ non-faulty servers among the ¾ · ½ it contacts, then expected number of servers a client needs to contact is approximately´¾ · ½ µ Ô Ö .
When a client does a write, it writes to some number of rows so that the probability of finding at least one non-faulty server from each of · ½ or more columns is greater than or equal to where is the confidence level. If Ô Û´ µ is the probability of a write being successful when a client writes to rows, then write cost is Û £ where Û is such that
and Ô Û´Û µ . Given the probability of a node being compromised and the total number of servers, there are two parameters that determine the values of the security and performance metrics. These are the threshold level and the degree of replication which is the number of rows or alternatively the number of columns .
We calculated the four metrics by varying these two parameters for a system of 45 servers with p = 0.15. Plot 5(a) shows availability and confidentiality for varying values of threshold , when number of columns is set to ¾ · ½ . Both availability and confidentiality are plotted in logarithmic scale, a probability value of ½ ½¼ Ü is plotted as Ü. Plot 5(b) shows read and write costs for the corresponding and values. It can be seen from these plots that, for a chosen optimally for every value, increasing increases access costs and confidentiality and decreases availability.
We can see from the plots in figure 5 that a hybrid scheme provides more flexible design options for the secure store. Given Ô, the likelihood of a node being compromised, the choice of the degree of replication and secret sharing depends on the security and performance metrics that need to be optimized. Clearly, when access cost or availability is of paramount importance, pure replication (Ö Ò ½ ¼) is the best option. On the other hand, when confidentiality is the critical metric, pure secret sharing (Ö ½ Ò ´ ½µ ¾ ) is the best option. There is a wide range of confidentiality, availability and access costs where the desired levels are achieved when the server nodes are arranged in a certain number of rows and columns. Thus, both replication and secret sharing are essential when certain bounds are placed on the security and performance metrics. For example, with a confidentiality requirement of ½ ½¼ ¿ , when access cost should not exceed 22 servers, the optimal choice would be ½ ¼ ¾ ½ . For a given assumption on Ô, the security level (confidentiality and integrity) can be increased by sacrificing availability and low access costs. On the other hand, decreasing the threshold level results in improved performance and better availability but exposes the stored data to a higher risk of being compromised. Thus, our analysis demonstrates that our hybrid scheme offers greater flexibility in meeting performance and security goals of a secure store. Apart from the flexible tradeoff our system offers between security and performance, one additional benefit in our system is tolerance to related attacks. When nodes vulnerable to related attacks are placed in the same column, stealing information is not any easier for an adversary.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a design for a distributed store that integrates replication and secret sharing to meet both performance and security needs while tolerating Byzantine faults. By our simple analysis, we have shown that for a probabilistic model of Byzantine failures, our design provides greater flexibility in meeting security and performance needs compared to either a pure replication or a pure secret sharing scheme. Although we used specific secret sharing and share renewal schemes for the discussion in this paper, the design of our system does not depend on any specific choice for these schemes. We could use any secret sharing or share renewal scheme that satisfies certain requirements, as appropriate for our protocols.
There are several directions in which our research can be pursued further. First, we are currently experimenting with and exploring other possible secret sharing schemes and one-way functions for our purpose. Currently, our system provides the same level of security and performance for all objects in the store. This could be further extended to provide flexible security guarantees, customizable on a perobject basis. Dynamic inclusion and exclusion of servers and secure authorization service are some interesting problems to explore. In the future, we also plan to prototype a secure store and evaluate it experimentally.
